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SUMMARY
Main findings in this report are given in the brief "headlines"
which introduce each section. The text explains and elaborates
on these headlines. Here we present the headlines with only the
minimum explanation necessary to summarize our results.
1. Defining deception. Deception is a broad concept which
encomuasses and goes beyond the ideas of cover, lying, and arti-
fice. In our view deception constitutes a deliberate misrepre-
sentation of reality done to gain a competitive advantage. There
are two basic variants of deception: the ambiguity-increasing
type, and the misleading type.
2. The deception process. Strategic deception is a process
of encoding, transmitting, and decoding messages. There are two
categories of messages in the process. These are: riicromessages,
i.e., the meaning of each signal in a deception; and macromessages,
the implications for his own action a target derives from the
totality of signals he receives.
3. The likelihood of deception. There are two groups of fac-
tors conditioning the likelihood of deception: personal qualities,
and aspects of the particular military situation. Personal factors
include the impact of culture, the nature of the political system,
the presence oi absence of deception in doctrine, and past experi-
ence. Military factors include the importance of the outcome, the
level of confidence in victory, and the degree of uncertainty in an
encounter.
4. The difficulties of deception. There are many points at
which deception can in theory failI It is a fragi.le and risky
II
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enterprise. Accidents may foil the transmission of deceptive
signals; undesired interpretations may result f:-om the psycho-
logical or organizational peculiarities of the target; circum-
stances may prevent a target's acting on a deceptive interpreta-
tion.
5. The advantages of the deceiver. In practice deceptions
usually succeed. They aid the deceiver's cause even if they n-i
not go strictly according to plan. Despite inevitable accidents
and uncertainties, deceptions succeed because adversaries must
seek out intelligence on their opponents, thereby risking decep-
tion; processes of human perception tend to favor the deceiver;
the uncertainties inherent in hostile competition often forgive
a deceiver's mistakes; and the cost of deception failure is usu-
ally low.
6. The advantage of tha offensive. Being on the offense
provides a better position for succeeding at deception then being
on the defense. This is particularly true in the early stages
of an attack. Defensive deception, however, can be effective
under the right circumstances. Among these circumstances, the
most important is anticipation of the need to begin a deceptive
scenario soon enough.
7. The impact of astuteness. Deceivers who act astutely can
enhance the advantages they already enjoy from the dynamics of
deceptive interaction. By applying acumen to see through the
target's eyes, by assessing his goals, by calibrating the degree
of time pressure exerted, and by following some basic deception
rules, deceivers can improve their chances of success.
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8. The importance of feedback. In strategic deception feed-
back is the deceiver's most valuable asset. It forms the basis
of the most astute deceptions. Feedback may be indirect, i.e.,
observational, or direct; the latter is preferable, more powerful,
and mocre difficult to achieve.
9. Doing counterdeception. Countering deception is extremely
difficult, but success need not always require detecting deception.
Merely sensitizing analysts to deception has its own problems.
Acumen seems a desirable trait in counterdeception analysts.
The use of alternative hypotheses and attempts to elicit confir-
mation of suspected deception from the adversary are recommended
techniques of counterdeception. By increasing the likelihood of
ambush a target can deter or foil deception without actually
detecting it.
10. Conclusions. Strategic deception is a powerful tool, par-
ticularly in the hands of an astute practitioner. The danger of
being confused about or misled in one's assessment of a military
situation, and the increased time and analytical energy demanded
to deal with potential deception, are unavoidable and often





This report presents the main findings and conclusions of
the NPS Deception Working Group. By design the group reflected I
a variety of academic disciplines and intellectual interests.
It consisted of two political scientists, an historian, a
physicist, a psychologist, an electrical engineer/systems sci-
entist, and a specialist in the application of psychological ]
insights and systematic research methods to the intelligence
process. Though each investigator worked more or less indepen-
dently when writing his or her individual study, all assumed
deception to be well-suited for multi-disciplinary inquiry and
all interacted regularly with one another in order to test and
refine ideas.
The group's intent was to illuminate the nature of deception,
its processes, and factors which condition when one resorts to
and succeeds at deception. In order to narrow the focus and facil-
"itate access to relatively concrete historical data, the grouc ori-
ented its efforts to the study of strategic military deceptions.
These involve large nurbers of individuals and organizations as
oerpetrators and victims of deception, including the national com-
mand authorities on both sides of the deception interaction. They
are relatively long-term deceptions, recurring over the course of
weeks or months. Their stakes are very high in that they can
affect the outcomes of wars cr large-scale front-level campaigns
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as opposed to tactical deceptions, which affect the outcome of
battles or local engagements.
The group's overall research strategy was twofold. The
members sought to develop a common view of deception, its
primary elements, and their relation. Each investigator then
applied or tailored existing social and engineering science
frameworks, hypotheses, and principles to the problem of stra-
tegic deception. The end result was the production of seven
studies completed between Fall 1979 and Spring 1980. Four
specifically focussed on the application of game, communication,
organization, and systems theories. The remaining three were
more eclectic, drawinq from historical cases and documencs and
from concepts and principles contained in a variety of academic
sources, especially political science and psychological literature
on decision-making and perceptual and cognitive processes. It
is from these seven studies and from some earlier preliminary
point papers that we draw the findings and conclusions for this
report. (See rigure 1 which identifies the investigators, their
acaaemic disciplines or specialties, and titles of their final
studies).
The group's research strategy was consistent with the fact
that there were no well-established basic concepts or theoretical
priors associated with the topic. The startin.j point for the
group's conceptualization consisted of rudimentary insights
drawn from personal experience, initial consideration of classic
cases such as the Normandy and Pearl Harbor attacks, and the
study of now declassified VThrl, War II and post-,---r documents
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TABLE 1
NPS Deception Working Group Members and Studies*
NAME DISCIPLINE/SPECIALTY STUDY
Donald C. Daniel Political Scientist Propositions on
Katherine L. Herbig Historian Military Deception
Richards J. Heuer Intelligence Cognitive Factors
Specialist in Deception and
Counterdeception
Theodore L. Sarbin Psychologist On the Psychological
Analysis of Counter-
deception




William Reese Physicist (1) Deception Within
a Communication Frame-
work
(2) Deception in a
Game Theoretic Frame-
work
Paul Moose Electrical Engineer/ A Systems Model for
Systems Scientist Deception
*All studies are contained in D.C. Daniel, K.L. Herbig et al.,
Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Military Deception (Technical
Report 56-80-012; Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1980).
setting down "lessons learned" from the wartime practice of
deception. The contribution of all these sources consisted
mainly of rules for the conduct of successful deception (te
credible; Keep the fact of deception a secret; Pay attention 2
to detail; and the like). While of some utility for orienta-
ting us to factors influencing success or failure, these rules
also proved misleading. They were simplistic, and they unduly
narrowed our perspectiveq. Tc some extent it was necessary t,"
"unlearn" them so as to fully appreciate the complexit-' of thL
deception phenomenon.
There are three sections to this report. The first deals
with the conceptual issues of defining decept'on, identifving
its variants, and outlining and characterizing the deception
process. The second centers on issues of practice. it focuses
on factors conditioning resort to deception, reasons for decep-
tion's success or failure, the advantage of the offensive for
a deceiver, questions of deceiver astuteness, the importance of
feedback, and counter-deception difficulties and options. The
third section concludes this report and offers our thoughts on
the utility of deception.




Deception is a broad concept which encompasses and goes
beyond the ideas of cover, lying, and artifice.
As in any research area, that of deception required hounding
the concept and analytically distinguishing it fror, related
terms. Several members of the Deception Working Group addressed
these problems in early point papers. Explicit or implicit in
all papers was the view that deception constituted a deliberate
misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive advantage.
The Daniel and Herbig study built on this definition, and
offered Figure 1 to illustrate that deception is a broad concept
encompassing several subsidiary ideas.
At the figure's center is cover, the military term for secret-
keeping and camouflage. It embodies deception's negative side
because it entails negating knowledge of the truth. Cover is
at the heart of deception because, no matter what his other goals,
a deceiver wishes to protect a secret, be it information about
an already existing reality (e.g., the capabilities of one's










The concept "lying" encompasses that of "cover." Not only
does a liar hold back the truth; he also acts to deflect his
victim away from it, thus highlighting deception's positive
side. Liars create and perpetuate falsities and seek to draw
a victim's attention to them. In a narrow sense, to lie simply
means making a statement the text of which is untrue, but in
a broader sense it can also involve manipulating the context
surrounding the statement in order to enhance its veracity.
This is what is meant by artifice, an important element of
nearly all strategic deceptions.
Just as lying subsumes cover, so does deception subsume
lying in both of its textual and contextual senses. The terms
are often used interchangeably, but deception and lying are not
exact synonyms. Lying looks primarily to one side of the
interaction between a liar and his audience. It stresses the
actions of the teller of falsehoods. Deception is a term of
wider scope because it also stresses the reactions of the re-
Sceiver of falsehoods. Som~eone whose false tale is not believed
I is still a liar, but he has not deceived. One does not fail at
lying because the audience is not convinced, but one does fail
at deception if the audience does not believe the lie. Even-
tually almost all deceptions are exposed as events unfold; thus
the trick for the deceiver is to insure his lies are accepted
long enough to benefit him.
The question cf benefits is important because they are a
necessary ingredient of deception as we see it. In our view,
to be labeled deception an act must be done to gain a
competitive advantage. This means, in effect, that there are
three goals in any deception. The immediate aim is to condition
a target's beliefs; the intermediate aim is to influence his
actions; and the ultimate aim is for the deceiver -o benefit
from the target's actions. Deceptions are often crcedited with
success when only the first goal is achieved, but to evaluate
the actual impact deception has on the course of events, its
success should properly be measured against the third goal.
Variants
There are two variants of deception, and they may be viewed
as end points on a continuum. The variant the deceiver intends
may not be that which results as an outcome.
Early in their deliberations, all mr-mbers of the group
accepted that there were two variants to deception, each opera-
ting in different ways and producing different effects. The less
elegant variety is the "ambiguity producing" or A type. Here
a deceiver acts to confuse a target by confronting him with at
least two choices as to what the truth may be. One of these
choices may be the truth itself, whose indicators the target
cannot completely hide. The greater the nuw.ýer of compelling
alternatives, the smaller the possiblity a target may by chance
settle on the true one as the basis for his actions. In order to
be compelling, it is necessary only that a deceiver's lies be
plausible enough and consequential enough to the target's well-
being that he cannot ignore them.
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A deceiver can benefit from an "A" deception in two ways.
Hoping tc reduce ambiguity by awaiting additional information,
a target may delay decision, thereby surrendering the initiative
to the deceiver and giving him wider latitude to marshal
resources. if the deceiver can insure that the situation re-
mains confusing, then the target may be forced to spread
resources thinly to cover all important contingencies. He there-
by reduces the resistance a deceiver can expect at any one point.
In contrast to deceptions increasing ambiguity, there is a
second, more complicated, category which we labelled "misleading"
or M type. They reduce ambiguity and fasten a victim's mind
to one (false) version of the truth. Whereas in A deceptions
the deceiver simply aims to have a target not reject as untrue
one or more .iternatives to the truth, the aim in the M variant
is to have the target reject the truth itself and all alterna-
tives to it except the one which suits the deceiver. Not only
must the lie be plausible, it must be so attractive, so con-
vincing, that the victim is willing to concentrate the bulk of
his operational resources on one contingency, thereby maximizing
the deceiver's chances for prevailing on all others. This
variant is particularly attractive in situations where the
deceiver believes he can keep most indicators of the truth from
ever reaching the target in the first place.
There are at least three types of misleading deceptions.
The first or M-1 variety seeks to have a victim accept as true
that which he is already inclined to believe. It is probably
the easiest of the M deceptions to carry through to success.
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Conversely, the most difficult of the M deceptions is the M-2
variety. Here the deceiver swims against the tide of the
victim's predispositions. He seeks to have the victim believe
that which the victim is inclined to doubt or view as false.
The M-3 version concerns those cases where the vicitm's pre-
dispositions (prior to the commencement of the deception) are
not directly relevant to or predictive of what the victim comes
to accept as true.
Although the two variants of deception, M type and A type,
are conceptually distinct and can be initiated with different
intentions in the deceiver's mind, in practice their effects
often coexist or shade into one another as the deception evolves.
In the latter case the direction of change generally appears to
be from M type to A type. Deceptions planned to mislead a target
into choosing one possibility may degenerate and instead increase
uncertainty if the target resists or postpones making the choice
the deceiver intends.
How one categorizes a particular deception partly depends on
the perspective one takes. The variants can differ whether
viewed from the deceiver's intentions or from the effect they
ultimately have on the target. Strategic deceptions seem to be
most often intended to mislead, since this form offers the
largest potential payoff to the deceiver. However, one would
expect pure misleading deceptions to obtain rarely because they
require a target to be so sure of a false alternative that he
stakes all on preparing for it. Prudent commanders seldom do_
this. They develop contingency preparations for other conceivable
!3
alternatives. Thus it is useful to consider the outcomes of
the two variants as a continuum between convinced misdirection
at the one pole and utter confusion, in which all looks equally
likely, at the other. The Barbarossa deception (misleading
Stalin about the German attack in June 1941) seems to be an un-
usually strong example of misdirection, while immediately before
D-Day Fortitude South (the deception associated with the Normandy
landing) would fall perhaps three-fourths of the w;ay toward the
misdirection pole. In the Barbarossa case the Germans ultimately
S(built on Stalin's expectation that the Third Reich would never
attack the USSR without first issuing an ultimatum. This
"ultimatum strategy," according to Whaley, "served to eliminate
ambiguity, making Stalin quite certain, very decisive, and
wrong." (Emphasis is original.) In the Fortitude case Hitler
and many of his generals thought in late May and early June 1944
that the main Allied cross-Channel invasion would come at Calais,
but they continued Lo consider a range of invasion site possi-
bilities along the Erglish Channel coast, including Normandy.
In sum, theŽre are two deception variants which differ in
their intended effects. One seeks to increase a target's un-
certainty and the other to decreasp it. It seems useful to
view these variants as end points in a spectrum with the outcome
of actual deception usually falling between the two extremes.
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Process
Strategic deception is a process of encoding, transmitting,
and decoding messages. There are two categories of messages in
the process.
Elements of the deception process. Figure 2 models the
basic or generic elements of the deception process as understood
by the group. It identifies a deceiver, his victim-or target,
communication channels linking them together, and signals trans-
mitted within the channels. It also illustrates that each of
these elements affects and is affected by environmental factors,
some of which are deliberately manipulated by the target as part
of his deception.
Figure 3 elaborates on the deceiver and target elements. The
deceiver's side consists of decision-makers, planners, and imple-
menters. Regardless of who had the inspiration, a deception does
tot begin until a decision-maker agrees to it. The historical
record reveals that wide-ranging strategic deceptions such as
Fortitude or Barbarossa are cleared only by the highest authori-
ties, but given their many responsibilities, they were unable
to devote much time to planning and implementation. During
World War II such tasks were assigned to small cadres in intel-
ligence-gathering and covert action organizations as well as mil-
itary staffs. These groups were often not a normal part of the
civilian or military bureaucracy but rather, like the famous
London Controlling Section, were specially formed durinc the
15
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war and disbanded or severely cut back at its conclusion. On
an as-needed basis, implementers temporarily coopted regular
military personnel who generated false radio traffic, set up
deceptive camouflage, simulated large troop movements or en-
campments and the like. National political leaders, high level
diplomats, civil servants, businessmen, and news reporters also
often played starring roles in strategic deceptions.
The initial target of a military deception is usually a
state's intelligence organization. It consists of channel
monitors who seek out and collect information and analysts who
coordinate and evaluate it. Gatekeepers within intelligence
agencies and command staffs screen the information and analyses,
and determine what is actually forwarded to civilian or military
authorities--the ultimate deception targets. Presumably relying
on information received, these leaders make the strategic or
tactical decisions which the deceivers seek to influence.
The links or "channels" between deceivers and targets make
deception possible, and their variety is unlimited. A channel
could be a newspaper monitored by the target, his reconnaissance
satellites, electronic intercept systems, diplomats, or spies.
Through these channels are transmitted signals, physical
phenomena which can be observed or sensed by the target. A
signal may be a news article on the activities of a general, a
reduction in military radio traffic, or a staged unloading of
ships. To a target preparing to repel an amphibious attack,
these signals are (planted) clues of the attacker's interest.
When put together they indicate that the attack will not soon
18
occur since the general expected to lead it is away on other
business, radio traffic is too sparse to support an attack, and
ships preparing to carry out an imminent landing usually onload
rather than offload goods.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the flow of signals in a strate-
gic deception is not only from deceiver to target. Because these
deceptions occur over weeks or months, the deceiver has time to
monitor his target's statements and actions in order to ascertain
the effects of the deception while it is still ongoing. The
statements and actions constitute return signals--termed
j "feedback.--which provide the deceiver a basis for modulating
his activities. In a successful deception, of course, the target
is not aware that his actions and statements constitute this kind
of feedback. Should the target realize it, the stage is set for
a further permutation in the deception process, entrapment of
the deceiver by his victim. By using the feedback channels to
send deceptive signals to his enemy, the target becomes the
deceiver and the deception channels become feedback for this new
layer of deception.
Environmental variables affecting the deception process are
almost infinite in number since they include any factor exoge-
nous to the set made up of deceiver, target, their communication
].inks and signals. As yet there is no framework for systemati-
cally accounting for or investigating environmental factors.
Even if such a framework existed, it is the deception group's
experience that it would be difficult to apply, for, while some
critically important idiosyncratic factors are generally and
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easily identifiable in historical analyses, the impact of
other variables is often impossible to isolate, much less measure.
A clearly distinguishable and often important group of en-
vironmental variables is the subset manipulated or controlled by
the deceiver. Engaging in artifice, he may act, e.g., to silence
sources passing on to the target information inconsistent with
the deception, or he may seek to increase the stature of indi-
viduals or organizations on the target's side whose views would
further acceptance of the deception.
Deception as a process. Implied in the above discussion is
a view of deception as a process of encoding, transferring, and
decoding messages where there are two categories of messages.
The message feature is evident in the example used earlier. In
it the target was concerned with repelling an expected amphibi-
ous attack, and the deceiver transmitted three signals to shape
the target's estimate of the attack's timing: a news article on
a general's activities, reduced radio traffic, and a staged un-
loading of ships. Each signal contained its own micromessage
to the effect that "the general is away," "radio traffic is too
sparse," and "ships are offloading." The micromessages become
important when the tar'get: properly interprets and conjoins them,
for they convey the overarching macromessage--"an amphibious
attack will not soon occur"--devised by the deceiver for the
target's consumption. In a misleading deception only one
macromessage is intended. In the ambiguity-producing variant,
a number of macromessages may be generated, each with its own
micromessage subset.
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The overall process of deception, then, is one where the
deceiver knows the truth he wants to protect; he concocts one
or more alternative truths (or macromessages) for dissemination
to the target; he deduces what micromessages will serve as
indicatcrs of the "truth"; he converts the micromessages into
signals or physical referrents which he transfers or rakes
available to the target. Starting with the physical referrents
the target reverses the process performed by the deceiver up to
the point of inducing the candidate or candidates for the "truth"
concocted by the deceiver. As the deception progresses, the
target's reaction to micromessages can serve as return signals
to the deceiver, giving him the opportunity to adjust his activi-
ties and make them more effective.
2
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There are two groups of factors conditioning the likelihood
of deception: personal qualities and aspects of the particular
military situation.
Two groups of factors influence the likelihood of military
deception: those which characterize situations confronting an
actor and those which actors bring to a situation by virtue of
previous conditioning or personal predilection. The factors may
operate independently or in combination with one another. It
is difficult to establish a priori which group is more important.
The second set probably has greater impact.
Of the first group, high stakes situations can certainly
influence willingness to deceive. When outcomes are critical,
adversaries are encouraged to make use of every capability,
every advantage, to insure victory or stave off defeat.
Resort to deception can be particularly compelling if
decision-makers are not fully confident of a situation's outcome
because of their own military weaknesses. Desiring to compensate
for them, they seek through some ruse to induce an enemy to lower
his guard, dilute his strength, or concentrate his forces on the
wrong objective. Plans Bodyguard and Barclay, for the invasions
of Normandy and Sicily, e.g., both reflected the concern that
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until a beachhead is secured, amphibious landings are highly
vulnerable to being pushed back into the sea. From the attacker's
perspective, it is thus imperative to assure that the defender's
response capability be as limited as possible. Weaker in mecha-
nized forces, Hitler similarly wanted to limit Allied response
to Case Yellow, the May 1940 push into France. He convinced the
Allies that his main thrust would be through Holland and Belgium.
While the Bricish and French massed in that direction, the
Wehrmacht's primary offensive was actually far to the south at
Sedan. It then turned toward the channel encircling the cream
of the Allied armies. The Dunkirk evacuation meant that the
bulk of these would fight again, but for France the war was lost.
Even when optimistic of the outcome of a situation, an actor
may be attract d to deception as one way to lower costs. The
wish to avoid being viewed as an aggressor has inspired many a
nation to fabricate evidence that its victim actually fired the
first shot. The wish to avoid human or material losses has
resulted in schemes such as the British plan in 1943 to protect
their bombers attacking Peenemunde. Though confident this
German rocket facility could be destroyed, the British sought
to minimize their own casualties. They succeeded in deflecting
Cerman .figqhters from their bomber streams by convincing the
enemy's air defense that Berlin was the target instead.
Situations characterized by uncertainty can also induce
deception. In those circumstances, actors often seek to mislead
or confuse in order to keep their options open and to test the
reaction to alternative policies. A state undecided as to
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whether to attack another, for instance, may still wish to be
ready to do so. This was the case prior to the last-minute
Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia. Having its troops
"exercise" in border areas for the greater part of the summer
allowed the USSR to proceed with preparations for an invasion
4
while not openly committing itself to this step. It also
allowed the Soviets to save face if they decided not to attack.
After all, the Czechs might have backed down, making attack
unnecessary, or they might have rallied the overwhelminq support
of the world coamunity, making the invasion option even more
unattractive.
In any of these situations, not all states or individuals
would resort to deception. Actors bring their own conditioned
responses, their own predilections, to the problems they face.
We see at least five factors possibly at play here.
First, there may be "deception styles" which vary from
culture to culture that would account for the differences in
when and how nations use deception. The intriguing thought that
some societies' values or expect:cO modes of personal interaction
condition individuals to understand and succeed at deception is
to our knowledge largely unexplored.
Studies of the Chinese have shown that deception has tradi-
tionally been part of Chinese military strategy because Lt is
so available in the ciltural norms. The Chinese assume inter-
personal deception will and should occur constantly between
individuals as a means of protecting face by deflecting too-
threatening truths. Since at least the doctrines of Sun Tzu
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in the fourth century B.C., the Chinese have long prized
victories gained by undermining through deception an adversaiy's
desire or ability to give battle. The potential link between a
culture's expectation for interpersonal truthfulness or decep-
tiveness and that culture's resort to military deception is not
yet well formed, but it remains suggestive. For example, does
a country like the United States, with a culture noted for the
openness, even the naivet6 of its interpersonal interactions,
find strategic deception uncongenial to its habitual ways of
thinking?
It is conceivable that by studying cultural norms we may
learn to predict how nations will employ deception in military
contexts. One analysis, e.g., cmnpares national patterns in
the deceptive practices of the Soviets and the Chinese. It
describes the Soviets' use of the "false war scare" to overawe
opponents, their penchant for "disinformation," and their
efforts to induce overestimation of their military capabilities.
This contrasts with the Chinese preference for the "deep lure,"
the multiple stratagem, and the anticipation of the enemy's
3intentions through acumen. This type of work suggests that by
expanding systematic comparison of national "deception styles,"
one can isolate patterns that could alert counter-deception
analysts sooner to the deceptive ploys of a particular culture.
A second conditioning factor may be the nature of the
political system in which an actor operates. This argument
is developed in a paper by Herbert Goldhamer in which he
contends that deception may be more common in states
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where political leaders take a strong, central role in military
decision-making. His work implies that politics either attracts
individuals prone to deception or conditions individuals to prac-
tice it. As a corollary to his general argument, he adds that a
tendency to deceive is particularly prevalent in dictatorships
and authoritarian regimes. He reasons that the "secrecy and
total control available [in these governments], and the reduced
inhibitions that accompany such exercise of power, facilitate
and provide incentives for the exercise of craft, cunning, and
deception.14
Paralleling Goldhamer's perspective are two closely related
factors. One is the bureaucratic imperative that organizations
trained for particular tasks will seek to perform them. The
other is the psychological trait that pecple tend to think in
terms of what is available or familiar to them. These phenomena
suggest that military deception is likely to occur if a nation
maintains an apparatus to plan and organize deception, or if
its military preserves, passes on, or at least debates a doctrine
for deception. Conversely, nations having no such apparatus
or doctrine, or which allow them to atrophy, must overcome the
inertia involved in creating or revivifying them--a situation
characteristic of America's early strategic deception efforts in
World War Two.
Finally, there is the issue of a person's own predilection
to deception. It is clear that even within the -ame cultural
or organizational setting, individuals differ in this regard.
Some leaders relish deception, others put up with it, still
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others resist it. Why this is so remains largely unexpicred.
Barton Whaley searched his historical data for evidence of a
"deceptive personality type," a group of attributes or experi-
ences that would account for these difference, but could find
none. At present we must be content to observe that personal
reactions to deception are at least ielf-consistent. That is,
a commander who has appreciated and relied on deception in the
past is likely to do so again. Winston Churchill was an early
proponent of deception in World War I and encouraged its elabora-
tion again twenty years later; Douglas MacArthur used serial
deceptions in his campaign across the Pacific, and succeeded
with deception again at Inch'on in Korea. In followina the
good advice to "know thine enemy," a nation might be well served
to evaluate its opponent's experience with deception.
Difficulties of Deception
There are many points at which deception can in theory fail.
It is a fragile and risky enterprise.
Succeeding at deception seems unlikely when we consider the
many difficulties which plague deceivers. New problems attend
each of the three stages of a deception, i.e., causing a target
to receive signals, to interpret them as intended, and to act on
them in a way which benefits the deceiver. These problems cen-
erate considerable uncertainty which seems intrinsic to doing
deception.
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The amateurish formulation and transmission of clues is
unlikely to fool an alert adversary. Even when signals are
flawlessly crafted and implemented, however, a deceiver may
be undone by accidents in transmission which he cannot predict
or prevent.
Figure 4 depicts accidents which may befall a signal after
a deceiver releases it into a channel and loses control over it.
In this figure the deception consists of eight clues arranged
at the top; the deceiver intends his target to put them together
like a puzzle to reach a deceptive conclusion. Clue 1 is shown
sent repeatedly in order to depict the variety of possibilities
for its fate.
Signal A represents the deceiver's fondest hope: the Target
receives and interprets the signal as the deceiver intended, so
an identical shape appears in the transmission, reception, and
interpretation columns. In Signal B the clue is modified or
garbled in the channel, and the target receives a different
signal, the square. How he will interpret this unexpected
signal the deceiver cannot know. Signal C is deflected in
transmission and never reaches the target receiver. V
Signals D and E depict smooth transmission and reception of
signals which are then damaged when the target interprets them
to find their micromessages. In D target analysts garble
the interpretation, i.e., they do not understand it as it was
intended. In E analysts do not see the significance of the
signal and dismiss it as trivial or irrelevant.
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4The last two signals represent the effects of white, (un-
controlled) or black, (unknown) channels on a deceiver's signals.
In F a competing signal, a circle, overwhelms the clue in
transmission and replaces it in the target's receiver. Again
the deceiver cannot predict how this new clue will be inter-
rreted. In G recepticn is intact but a competing signal's
implications overwhelm the signal in interpretation and replace
it.
The accidents which interrupt and corrupt a signal before
it reaches its destination often resemble what communications
theorists define as "noise." As Reese points out, strict ad-
herence to the definition of noise in communications theory
would restrict our labeling as noise only the random accidents
between transmission and reception of the signal, i.e., signals
B and C in our figure. Accidents in interpretation, or those
which result from deliberate, competing signals, do not meet
physicists' standards of randomness, though to the deceiver's
plans they will be equally devastating.
Accidents in interpretation sometimes cannot be avoided.
Since by definition deceivers wish to remain undetected, they
must operate indirectly, at a discrete remove from their
victims; they cannot risk overplaying their hand in order to
guide the target's analysis. The target must inadvertently
meet the deceiver halfway by figuring out what the evidence
means for himself. In effect, the deceiver must have the con-
nivance of the target to succeed at deception, and thus all
deception includes an element of self-deception through the
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target's active participation.
Two factors are especially pertinent to difficulties in
predicting how an opponent will interpret a given clue: psycho-
logical perception and organizational processes. Heuer points
out that perception is more than a passive response to stimuli.
It is an active constructing of reality wherein one selects,
arranges, and attaches meanings to certain stimuli from the
great mass available. Individuals do this on the basis of
rules and conventions learned over time. One's past experiences
and training inevitably set in place a "mind set" which in
Heuer's words is "akin to a screen or lens through which we
perceive the world."5 A signal picked up by the target's sen-
sors intact may be misperceived as it passes through the mind
set of the individual or group assigned to understand what it
means. What seems to the deceiver a clear and logical infer-
ence anyone would draw from a clue may be filtered out or twist-
ed by the target.
A second source of misinterpretations is the effect
organizations may have on the interpretation of data. Sherwin
reminds us that intelligence organizations are the initial
tar•oQ-s of deception. Ultimately a decision-maker imust be led
into acting against his best 4 nterests for the deception to
succeed, but this first involves fooling the organization which
receives and interprets the signals which go into an intelli-
gence evaluation. In addition to the perceptual filters indi-
viduals bring to their tasks, the organization is likely to
have norms and assumptions about what certain things mean or
31
portend. In effect the organization often socializes its
members into a group viewpoint, which if known can be played
on by a deceiver.
Should an analyst resist the prevailing views of the group
and raise a new possiblity, another aspect of organizational
life may prevent his dissent from succeeding. Despite a com-
mitment to objectivity, most hierarchical organizations cannot
escape seeing the importance of an interpretation as a function
of the status of the person espousing it. Dissent from the top
commands more attention than dissent from a low-level analyst,
no matter how well-founded his suspicions. The pressures toward
group consensus in any organization tend to eliminate eccen-
tricity, including an occasional offbeat but correct view.
These group processes can slant, block, or filter the
meanings assigned by a group to a series of clues. If a
deceiver's signals run aground on some bureaucratic sensitivity,
or on the "mind set" of the organization, he will fail to
shape his target's beliefs.
Further difficulties arise from the fact that even when a
decision-maker is fooled by a deception, he may not always act
on his false beliefs. Contingencies can intervene which pre-
vent the target from taking the action the deceiver is trying
to elicit. On the one hand, new information or pressures may
impinge on a decision-maker, causing him to act in unexpected
ways not consistent with his deceptively-induced beliefs.
Bureaucratic competition for scarce resources, for example,
sometimes prevents carrying out activities which in all other
respects seem inevitable.
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On the other hand, in the mere passage of time from the
point at which the deceiver planned and executed his series of
signals until the target must take action, the situation may
have changed and become something quite different. The ori-
ginal clues, once convincing and incorporated into the target's
interpretation, may not elicit the expected action if events
overtake them in the meantime. Then again chance in its many
forms, e.g., bad weather or misplaced orders, can intervene to
prevent action otherwise intended.
Advantages of the Deceiver
In practice deceptions usually succeed. They aid the
deceiver's cause even if they do not go strictly according to
plan.
Listing these many difficulties suggests that deceptions
should seldom work, and yet the evidence available to us shows
that they usually do. In part this paradoxical outcome may be
an artifact of the familiar bias toward only documenting
success. Bungled deceptions rarely appear in a deceiver's
historical record, and they can seldom be proven after the fact
by the target. We should search out and study more instances
of deception failures to help overcome this bias. In the mean-
time, however, the records we do have suggcst additional factors
which help explain why deceptions succeed despite the difficul-
ties we have identified. Some powerful elements in the
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relationship between adversaries, in human perception, and in
the environment play into the deceiver's hands.
One source of this advantage is embedded in the basic goals
of hostile competition. Each adversary eagerly seeks out
information about the other, while at the same time trying to
deny access to information about itself. By opening up channels
to the outside, and particularly to his opponent when possible,
the adversary also opens himself up to being deceived via those I
channels. Although raw data about the enemy and the situation
may flow into intelligence centers in enormous volume, highly
reliable information is often scarce. A competitor is not able
to dismiss information which may be true and which portends
serious consequences. This puts the benefit of the doubt about
the validity of such information on the side of the deceiver,
for it ensures his deceptive clues a hearing by his target.
On balance, the processes of human perception and cognition
provide a second source of advantage for the deceiver. While
a few patterns in human thought favor the target, particularly
in cases where the deceiver must change the target's mind, most
of these patterns appear to conspire against the target. He
is more often betrayed than served by his own processes of
thought.
Psychologists characterize perception and cognition as
organizing activities. Making what seems chaotic into a coher-
ent, orderly, and at least Dartiallv oredictable Dattern is
basic to human thought. The yuantities of stimuli and types of
information around us would overwhelm the senses were they
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not selectively ordered by perceptual processing. The stimuli
which do pass through the filters of our senses are recognized
and categorized using concepts evolved from past experience.
The meaning assigned to any one stimulus depends in part on
the meanings ot the other events, objects, or ideas which
exist with it and form its context. In Sarbin's view the best
analogy for understanding human thought processes is the
creation of a narrative which ties together the disparate
elements into a plot. By plotting a story which explains events
chronologically, individuals keep the sense that they know with
some confidence "what comes next" and can on this basis plan
for the future. The drive for coherence is not a perfect
process, however. Inevitably simplifications result in the
loss of some information. The mind follows certain rules of
convenience, sometimes called biases, which are not always
optimal ways of sorting out information. Often these biases
favor the deceiver.
The Appendix summarizes Heuer's discussion of cocgnitive
and perceptual biases relevant to deception. Here we consider
briefly why deceivers tend to profit from most of these
patterns.
According to heuer, the conclusion which emerges from
considering these biases is that initial impressions are
-xtremely important in that they shape all subsequent under-
standings of an event. Apparently the mind works by taking
incremental steps: what we first learn abovt a topic becomes
the touchstone against which each new datum is compare,.
i]1
While some change in the overall concept does result from
these later inputs, it is the persistence of the initial formu-
lation and the resistance to changing it which are the striking
features of the perceptual process. Five of the eleven biases
Heuer describes converge to put a target of deception at the
mercy of his initial impressions if they are reinforced by a
deceiver: expectations shape what we in fact perceive; percep-
tions are quick to form but resistant to change; initially
ambiguous perceptions delay the ability to clarify an assess-
ment even when clear-cut evidence becomes available; estimates
of the probability of some future event cluster around an
initial starting point and resist radical alteratinn; and even
after evidence has been completely discredited, the impressions
based on it often persist and shape one's thinking. This con-
vergence on the psychologicdl importance of first exposure and
the presumptions brought to data suggests why studies consis-
tently find that M-1 deception, wherein a deceiver reinforces
his target's existing views, are the most commonly tried, the
most powerful, and the most likely to succeed of the deception
variants. Barton Whaley's findings provide telling support
for this: of 68 cases of strategic interaction he studied, he
found that 79% pf them succeeded by reinforcing what the target
expected.
6
We have seen hoe.: a deceiver profits from a target's eager-
ness for information ancd from many of the biases in human
thought. He also benefits from a third factor, the effects
of inherent uncertainties. Especially i., competitions where
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virtually all data are ambiguous and to some degree suspect,
so often the case in war, the situation forgives most of the
mistakes a deceiver makes. For example, security leaks, a
major kind of mistake, seldom destroy a deception. If the
deceiver's true plans, or the fact that deception is afoot,
reaches a target, evidence suggests this is often not fatal
to the deceiver's hopes. To explain this counterintuitive
finding we must adopt the target's perspective: faced with an
array of evidence which can rarely be documented as completely
reliable, he must use more-or-less ambiguous data. Leaks to him
must seem just another species of potentially true or potentially
false signals. Even leaks which come from well-placed sources
or over channels which are usually reliable must still jostle
and compete against the range of alternatives the target's evi-
dence supports. What seems to the deceiver a glaringly bright
give-away often seems to the target either too good to be true
or only one more among his many grey-colored clues.
Two psychological tendencies we have already mentioned con-
tribute to the less-than-disastrous impact on most deceptions
of security leaks. A leak is a new piece of evidence which con-
tradicts or calls into question a previous assessment. Both the
bias toward fitting new evidence into existing theories, even
if it means twistinq the new evidence to fit, and the bias to-
ward maintaining one's impressions despite the subsequent dis-
crediting of their source, tend to undercut the impact of a leak's
new evidence.
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A final advantage the deceiver holds is that although
deception almost always inflicts costs on the target, attempting
it entails few penalties for the deceiver even if it does not
come off as planned. If the target is deceived he will probably
act in a manner detrimental to his own interests; if he resists
being taken in by the deception, he must st 11 devote time and
resources to evaluating the evidence and estt..Dlishing probabili-
ties for the future from the mas3 of clues. Trying deception, on
the other hand, is often inexpensive because most illusions
consume few of the total available resources. Failure, even
being caught red-handed, does not prevent future successes at
deception against the same target. The price of failure does
entail the destruction of some "assets" for deception such as
double agents or covert channels which are "blown," but these
are less net losses than they are the foregoing of future
benefits. The deceiver is always cushioned by the elemental
fact that he knows the truth of his own intentions, and thus
what is true from what is deceptive. The target does not and
cannot with certainty know this, and the investment necessary
to sort through yet another level of complexity introduced by
deception falls with unequal force on the target's side.
Advantage of the Offensive
Being on the offense provides a better position for suc-




particularly true in the early stages of an attack. Defensive
deception, however, can be effective under the right circumstances.
It is reasonable to argue that being on the offensive pro-
vides a better position for succeeding at deception than being
on the defensive. The basis for this view is that the initiator
of military action is defining the nature and timing of the
encounter and thereby has a greater degree of control over it
at the outset. Because he knows what the truth will be--i.e.,
the location, timing, and manner of the planned attack--he
can better orchestrate the dissemination of untruth than the
defender who, in a sense, has no similar "truth" of his own
providing a baseline for devising untruths. The defender
obviously knows what he wants to defend, but he remains more
or less uncertain as to specifically when and where he will be
challenged by an attacker. He is also probably uncertain as
to the magnitude and kind of attack he will face.
The attacker's deception advantage is usually greatest in
the early stages of his offensive campaign. Once the campaign
is well on its way, the situation often does not remain stable
long enough for the attacker to devise and implement deception.
A classic illustration is the relative non-use of strategic
deception by the Allies after the Normandy breakout. The
rapidly changing strategic situation between September 1944 and
May 1945 was not conducive to the play of deception.
While being on the defense may not be conducive to
engaging in deception, it would be wrong to say that defensive
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deceptions cannot occur. They can be very effective under the
right circumstances, especially given adequate time and re-
sources. The defending party may attempt, e.g., to lay
inviting axes of advance for enemy ground forces while remaining
ready to ambush them should they take the bait. If the defender
fears enemy bomber or missile strikes, he can also engage in
extensive camouflage and decoy aimed at drawing enemy weapons
away from high value targets to dummy sites instead. The British
did this in 1940-1941, with limited results since they did not
act to protect their assets until after war had begun. Their
experience illustrates that defensive deceptions--at least of
that type--have the highest chance for success if they are
undertaken before the need for them is obvious because by then
the time and resources needed to implement them may not be
sufficient.
Astuteness
Deceivers who act astutely can enhance the advantages they
already enjoy from the dynamics of deceptive interaction.
Cleverness on the deceiver's part can reinforce his chances
of successfully deceiving his adversary. Certain behaviors
distinguish expert deceivers from their mediocre counterparts.
Experts seem to share a turn of mind useful for predicting the
reactions of others, and they understand the demands deception
imposes on them.
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IThe most successful deceivers rely on some individuals who
have acumen, an ability to "de-center" or step outside one's
own viewpoint into the mind-set of an opponent. Someone with
a keen sense of acumen can empathize closely enough with a
target to predict with considerable confidence how he will see
and respond to a given situation. British deception experts
in World War II stressed the importance of individuals who
could "get inside" the German mind and construct in their
imagination how German analysts would piece together and
interpret evidence.
Acumen seems to depend not only on logical ability;
emotional and imaginative qualities play important parts.
Thus in the British case during World Wa* II, many of their
most successful deception staffers brought their "flair" with
them from diverse, non-military backgrounds in literary,
theatrical, and business fields. Sarbin suggests that although
it may be difficult, conceivably one could develop means to
identify persons gifted with acumen, on the theory that this
trait would be as valuable for counterdeception as it has
proven to deceivers in the past.
Assuming a potential deceiver can bring to bear keen in-
sights into the perceptions of his victim, how should he pro-
ceed in order to maximize his chances of success? Deciding
what are the target's basic goals would seem to be a natural
starting point. Knowing his goals should facilitate predicting
the options to which he will best respond. The deceiver should
send clues which give impressions consistent with the target's
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goals, for these, as we have discussed above, he will most
readily recognize and believe. If, as Moose suggests, one
side's goals are directed toward preserving the status quo,
the other side can predict they will be especially sensitive
to signs that the current situation is stable. A clever
deceiver should then provide those signs while preparing to
disrupt that stability. At the level of generality of change
vs. status quo, it appears that either an ambiguity-increasing
or a misleading deception would accomplish the deceiver's
object: if the target is confused he is likely to seize ex-
cuses to delay decision and action until he receives clarifica-
tion; it he is misled by appearances that the deceiver
acquiesces in the status quo, he will likewise do nothing. As
elaborated by Reese in his application of game theory to
deception, doing nothing until the situation clears is often a
fatally attractive option which leads to one's being surprised.
Beyond concerning himself with a target's goals, an astute
deceiver should try to determine his target's beliefs and
expectations vis ' vis the impending encounter. As emphasized
earlier, a deceiver has a marked advantage if he spins a tale
which a target is already predisposed to believe. Experts at
deception strike a balance between keeping their deception
subtle enough so as not to arouse the target's suspicions, and
intervening vigorously enough to have the desired reinforcing
effect.
The greatest demands are made on a deceiver's astuteness
if he must change a target's beliefs. Deceivers here should
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sequence their clues in a way which aims to shake the target's
initial ideas severely enough that he "reopens the case" in
his mind. By overcoming the tendency to assimilate new evidence
to existing views with an initial large, compelling piece of
evidence, the deceiver may force the target to reorient his
views. Additional corroborating clues will then help to build
up a plausible scenario of the deceiver's choice. The British
"Mincemeat" ruse during World War II is an example of this
sequencing to change the target's mind: confronted by a drowned
courier with plans suggesting invasion sites on Sardinia, Hitler
and his generals deployed forces away from Sicily, the real site,
even though they had initially guessed correctly where the
invasion would come.
It seems paradoxical but true that deceivers seeking to
change a target's views should also aim to make him vigilant,
even though that very vigilance may be instrumental in a target's
rejecting a deceiver's false tale. Why this is so requires
distinguishing three emotional states associated with mnaking
important decisions.
The first of these is relaxation: an individual feels no
tension because no such decision is required of him. The second
is that of moderate tension, or vigilance: some tension arises
from the need for a decision, but it remains moderate as long as
the individual believes he has adequate time to evaluate alterna-
tives before deciding on one. The third state is high tension,
or rigidity. Here the individual feels great stress because time
seems inadequate to properly evaluate alternatives.
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Psychologists argue that individuals are most apt to follow
their predispositions in either the first or the third emotional
states: when they are relaxed, or when they are very tense. In
the first case, facing no important decision, the individual
sees no disadvantage in giving head to his predispositions.
Pressed for important decisions in a hurry, on the other hand,
individuals fall prey to what they consciously or subconciously
choose to see. It is the second state of moderate tension, or
vigilance, that elicits responses most likely to overcome pre-
dispositions. Individuals are then evidently most open-minded
as they seek out information to make a rational decision. In
short, deceivers should confront a target with the need to make
an important decision but should avoid placing the target in a
crisis situation if the aim is to change the target's beliefs.
In "Operation Mincemeat" the British organized their clues
to suggest that Sardinia would be invaded in the coming months,
but not imzrediately. Hitler and his intelligence staffs were
given reason to doubt their expectations about Sicily. They
had time to reassess the situation and put together an alterna-
tive scenario incorporating Sardinia. Had the British rushed
them into crisis-decision-making, they would probably not have
shifted their forces so cooperatively.
In other circ'rmstances the astute deceiver will decide that
he gains most by generating just such a crisis in decision-
making for the target. Looking at how organizations function,
Sherwin notes that increasing stress improves an organization's
ability to process information cnly to a certain point.
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Thereafter the internal system collapses and the organizaLion
cannot systematically process data. This "fibrillation"
could be very useful to a deceiver who needs to paralyze the
target's intelligence and command structures while he moves
quickly against him.
However, the cost the deceiver pays for deliberately pro-
voking the false perception of crisis by his opponent is some
inability to predict his responses accurately. What the
deceiver knows about a target's normal behavior during steady
state periods is undercut when the target moves into crisis
and shifts to extraordinary coping behavior. It may be advan-
tageous to a deceiver to risk this unpredictability in order
to reduce the target organization's efficiency. Many of the
distracting deceptions connected with the Normandy landings,
for example, such as dummy paratroops and multiple fake landing
sites, served to stretch and overload the ability of German
intelligence to sort out and respond to threat. There is some
danger, though, that by generating crisis the deceiver will find
himself facing some unexpected response which was saved just
for such exigencies. Perhaps the key to assessing this risk
is the quality of the deceiver's channels of information to
the target, in particular the feedback channels we will discuss
below.
In addition to seeing things through the target's eyes,
assessing his goals, and determining how much time pressure a
victim should fare, astute deceivers recognize that they should
follow certain rules to maximize their chances of succeeding.
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Past deception experts have left primers which distill the
lessons they learned from experience. If not applied too rigidly,
these lessons continue to be useful. For example, a scenario for
deception on a strategic scale, which by definition is complex
and persists for at least several weeks, must remain plausiole
to the target for as long as it is running. One aspect of estab-
lishing plausibility is making sure the target obtains cc.ifirma-
tion of the crucial deceptive elements from various and reliable
sources. Another is to ensure the scenario adapts to changing
circumstances and evolves in a "real-life" way. The besL
deceivers are sensitive enough not to overplay their hand: they
knit false clues into a web of many truths which can be indepen-
dently verified and found to "ring true." The more data points
are determined by the target to be true, the more likely he is
to twist or ignore the remaining discrepant ones to fit his hy-
pothesis. In addition, clever deceivers try to sabotage as many
sources of disconfirming evidence as possible, and they strive to
lay before the target proof that they have the capabilities to
carry out the operations the deceptive scenario suggests.
This advice reflects an intuitive understanding of several
psychological biases people bring to the analysis of evidence
(see Appendix) on psychological factors in deception. In
particular, deception experts seek to play on individuals'
over-sensitivity to consistency. Since people will believe a
small sample of consistent data more readily than a larger, more
statistically reliable sample whicn is inconsistent, deceivers
aim for a variety of clues which all reinforce and support one
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scenario. However, there is another side to the need for con-
sistency. People also tend to under-estimate the importance
of missing data in an array of evidence. W1hat is chere blinds
them to the significance of what is not. The clever deceiver
realizes that he need not, and probably should not, try to tie
up every loose end and hypothetical possiblity in his scenario.
The target will work with the evidence he has and will tend to
discount what is missing. An elaborate airtight case might ex-
cite suspicion if it looked "too good to be true," that is too
consistent, and it may not allow sufficient flexibility to weave
in chance events as they occur. Resisting the temptation to go
too far in onc's desire to ensure the target makes the right
deductions is one of the hallmarks of astute deceivers.
Feedback
In strategic deception feedback is the deceiver's most
valuable asset. It forms the basis of the most astute
deceptions.
In order to carry out an extended deception one must adapt
it to the changes inevitable in an evolving situation. The
deceiver's most valuable asset for doing this is feedback.
Feedback is accurate and timely information about an adversary's
reactions. It can be direct or indirect; the former is more
powerful, the latter more common.
4,7
Indirect feedback simply consists of observing how the other
side responds to an action or event. It is available to anyone
who systematically observes any sort of interactiorn including
deception. One acts and waits for visible signs of the oppo-
nent's reactions. If an action is specifically designed to
test the reaction, indirect feedback is usually better
focused and likely to be more useful in characterizing an
opponent.
For strategic deception, however, a more precise form of
feedback is usually desirable. Since military adversaries
cover up their own reactions and simulate appearances to suit
their needs, visible reactions can be unreliable. The side
which achieves a reliable covert channel into his opponent's
camp over which feedback can flow has, as spy novels often
portray, a most precious advantage. This is direct feedback
consisting of systems such as ULTRA in World War II or well-
placed -spionage agents. They pass information which in effect
short-circuits the normal channels between sides. Adversaries
as a matter of course eagerly seek such useful channels be-
cause the information obtained is usually more complete and
unambiguous than indirect feedback would be. However, as the
fate of most spies demonstrates, direct channels are also
inherently risky and usually temporary.
In addition to providing fuller, more reliable insight
into the enemy's camp, direct feedback may allow the deceiver
to risk lying more often and get away with it. Typically, the
deceiver must use many true siqnals in which a few lies are
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embedded in order to protect the impression of reliability
his target has of the channels. If the target finds the
information from a channel is false too often, i.e., more than
the rate of error normal for such channels, he will stop
relying on it. Direct feedback tells the deceiver quickly
which of his lies the target accepts and which he questions,
what he finds suspicious or inexplicable, and what he swallows
without qualm. Thus the deceiver can at once back up lies
which are questioned, or soft-pedal them, so that numerous lies
can be passed and protected without damaging the target's
perception of how reliable the channel is. The British use of
their double agent system in World War II is an extreme example
of the rich possibilities for such a direct feedback system
and its potential for passing lies. Many of the dangers from
uncontrolled channels and from random accidents in deception
scenarios can be eliminated by direct feedback because these
hitches can be detected and corrected quickly, before an
alternative scenario has taken hold in the target's mind.
Furthermore, direct feedback prevents a target from ambushing
the deceiver, which removes the largest threat the deceiver
faces.
A third aspect of direct feedback's value for deception
lies in its ability to overcome the unpredictability associ-
ated with crisis. Moose argues that indirect feedback may
well suffice adversaries in situations where a competitive
system persists over a fairly long period of time. When change
is gradual and the parts of the system interact in stable
ways, predictions of what the other side will do based on
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observations of past behavior can be quite accurate. Stability
not only implies peaceful conditicns; piolonged conflict
between evenly matched adversaries could become similarly
predictable.
However, in times of transition or crisis, such as a surprise
attack or warfare between opponents with rapidly shifting rela-
tive strengths, each side replaces its usual modes of operation
with emergency routines. It no longer acts "normally." New
pressures generate extraordinary exertions or desperate expe-
dients, and the rapid changes each side undergoes prevent pre-
diction based on observing the responses of the adversary. By
the time one observes a response the opponent may have changed
in some crucial way and will not or cannot respond that way
again in the future. Thus in crises or transitions, when equi-
librium and stability are lost, direct feedback with its shorter
response time offers the only realistic means to predict the rp-
ponent's next likely move. By allowing a deceiver to hold his
fingers on the pulse of his target even while the latter is
changing rapidly, direct feedback allows the deceiver to keep up,
providing new clues as needed to prolong and preserve the
scenario's plausibility.
Deceivers themselves have viewed direct feedback as crucial
for their success in elaborate, long-term deceptions. John
Bevan, head of the British deception effort in London after 1943,
credited their unusually intimate feedback through ULTRA with
supporting the complex, multi-layered deceptions the British
launched against the Germans. Often by coordinating information
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from ULTRA with their extensive network of turned German agents,
British deceivers could incorporate the Germans' unexpected
interpretations of their signals or sudden shifts in events into
the deception scenario. This ability to touch on additional
true reference points enhanced credibility considerably. This
feedback also allowed the British to back off when a story wore
thin, which prevented the enemy firmly concluding that deception
was at hand, and allowed the deceivers to salvage their precious
double agents and other resources for further deceptions.
The contrast between the sophisticated Allied strategic
deceptions in the European theatre during World War II and the
relatively simple American efforts in the Pacific promises to
be instructive as more data on the Pacific cases becomes avail-
able. Certainly one explanation for these differences was the
quality of feedback adversaries in each theatre achieved. In
Europe the British, later the Allies, had unusually good intalli-
r• gence, perhaps so good it is unlikely to be matched again, while
German intelligence degenerated quickly to become unusually
poor. In the Pacific, intelligence may have been more evenly
matched until close to the end, but even with MAGIC, the Allies
did not have direct feedback from Japan comparable to ULTRA.
Pacific strategic deceptions appear, on the basis of initial
study, tn have been more tentative, less opportunistic in
building on evolving events, and considerably more cautious as
a consequence of persistent uncertainties about how the
Japanese were responding. Observational feedback, e.g., reports
on Japanese troop movements and ship positions, and the lucky
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capture of Japanese documents guided American deceivers in
operations such as WEDLOCK and BLUEBIRD, both designed to
protect the truth about where American forces would strike next.
The importance of direct feedback for perpetrating strategic
deception relative to other factors which differed between the
European and Pacific Theatres, such as familiarity with the
enemy culture and language, or the physical size of the area
of operations, awaits further investigation.
Counterdeception
Countering deception is extremely difficult, but success
need not always require detecting deception.
Countering deception is traditionally conceived of as a
two-step process of first detecting and then foiling deceptic'n.
This discussion will focus on each step in turn after presenting
a few observat ons on the counter-deception problem in general.
The difficulty countering deception. Barton Whaley has
analyzed 68 cases of attempted strategic military surprise
occurring between 1914 arid 1968. Fifty-seven of the instances
involved resort to deception, and of this group, 50 (or 38 per-
cent) resulted in some degree of surprise. It is necessary to
emphasize that the cases Whaley studied seem skewed in the
direction of successful surprise; nevertheless, Whaley's data
suggest that deception may be very difficult to foil, especially
since the target in e~c!. case had the benefit of at least some
warning.
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This conclusion is not surprising since the deception
variants which seem to occur most often--the M-1 and A types--
are those where the target is the most cooperative. The diffi-
culty of countering M-1 deceptions is that the target is
inclined to accept the perpetrated lies before the deception
starts; his perceptual and cognitive biases militate against
his rejecting them. It is noteworthy that 79 percent of
Whaley's cases involved exploiting a target's preconceptions.
In A decep ions, the deceiver need only send lies which are
plausible and consequential to the target's interests. If the
lies go through to the target, the latter's desire to make
rational or good decisions helps guarantee tha- he will not
ignore the deceptive information. If he delays making a final
choice in order to await additional clarifying data, he surren-
ders the initiative and leaves himself open to surprise. If
he hedges by distributing resources to cover plausible contin-
gencies, he faces the prospect that his resources will be in-
adequate to deal with the contingency on which the deceiver
will act.
Only in M-2 deceptions does an initial advantage lie with
target. His perceptual and cognitive biases incline him from
the start to ignore deceptive messages and to doubt their
veracity.
Detecting deception. Sources such as ULTRA or an agent in
the enemy's heddquarters are probably the best ways to establish
whether that enemy is being deceitful. These sources, however,
are generally unavailable and certainly not foolproof. ULTRA,
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e.g., did not prevent the Allies from being surprised by
Germany's Ardennes offensive during the winter of 1944 (the
Battle of the Bulge).
Any state's attempt to harness more mundane intelligence
assets to the counter-deception problem must be done delicately.
Consistent with the psychological arguments we have presented
earlier, it is highly probable that attempts to sensitize
intelligence analysts to the prospect of deception will in-
cline them to find "deception" when it isn't there. Indeed,
as Heuer suggests, intelligence analysts are generally predis-
posed to perceive deception without any encouragement to look
for it. He reasons:
Instances of successful deception are far
easier to recall than cases in which deception
was not employed under similar circumstances
and this sensitizes [an intelligence analyst]
to the possibility of deception. [Analysts]
are [alsol attracted to deception as an ex-
planation for otherwise incongruous events
because the deception explanation allows [them]
to impose order and reason on a disorderly
world, and because it enables [them) to attri-
bute deviousness and malevolence to...enemies.
These factors sometimes cause [analysts] to
perceive deception when it is not really
present.7
Heuer's conclusion parallels that of Sarbin who argues, in
effect, that to encourage an analyst to look for deception will
probably lead him to subject intelligence data to particularly
detailed or fine-grained scrutiny. "To use a more fine-grained...
proLedure has an important implication: the observer will read
into the behavior [of actor(s) being observed] the interpretation
that the actor(s) are being deliberate, rather than spontaneous;
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the instantiation 'being deliberate' rather than 'spontpneous'
is more .ikely to be followed by the attribution of deception
to the observed sequence." 8
In short, sensitizing analysts to the possibility of deception
can have pernicious effects, including a high false alarm rate
and a resulting "cry wolf" syndrome where true deception is
discounted. It can also lead to a situation where analysts, no
longer sure what they should accept as true, impose such rigid
standards of proof that they suppress either the freeplay of
intuition so much a part of intelligence analysis or the flow
of intelligence from analysts to decision-makers. Prior to
the Cuban Missile Crisis, e.g., John McCone, CIA Director,
suspected the USSR was emplacing missiles into Cuba and alerted
President Kennedy several times. The President grew impatient
with McCone when the latter could produce no hard evidence.
McCone reacted by drawing back; despite his suspicions he did
not raise the issue again until the U-2 photos provided clear
proof.
Suppressing intuition for the sake of clear-cut proof can
be particularly unfortunate if, as Sarbin contends, a variant
of intuition, acumen, is the key to discovering deception.
Prediction by acumen, [he writes,] is the stock
in trade of persons who can penetrate the masks
or expose the lie of the antagonist. [They] do
this...through empathic skill .... Literary sources
abound in examples of this quality: Chesterton's
gifted sleuth Father Brown and the narrator in
Edgar Allen Poe's detective stories made their
predictions of the behavior of others through
'taking the role of the other.'9
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Simple controlled experiments have established that some people
have a talent for "de-centering" or "taking the role of the
other," but one should hesitate, Sarbin contends, "to select
persons as deception analysts exclusively on the basis of
current research." It also remains to be seen whether a
person selected for acumen in interpersonal relations could
apply his skill to good effect in analyzing international
political or military situations.
Less difficult than findin• individuals with proper acumen
is the institutionalization of intelligence procedures consis-
tent with counter-deception. These procedures are usually
recommended for avoiding intelligence surprise in general.
They include methods for generating alternative hypotheses of
enemy behavior against which evidence is sought and evaluated.
A devil's advocate is one well-known method; another is competing
analyses by different agencies which are given access to the same
information.
It is not enough, of course, for an intelligence organization
to suspect strongly or detect traces of deception. (Indeed, the
possibility of deception often readily comes to mind in ambiguity
producing cases.) A target must still separate the real from the
lie. History is replete with cases where the lie has been
accepted as real and where truth has been deemed to be deception.
A classic example occurred prior to the Soviet Summer offensive
of 22 June 1944. Working to convince the Germans that the
attack would be concentrated against Army Group North Ukraine,
the Soviets actually prepared to strike Army Group Center instead.
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Between 30 May and 22 June signs of a Soviet buildup off Army
Group Center "multiplied rapidly as the deployment went into
high gear, but they were not enough to divert the OKH's [i.e.,
the German Army's High Command] attention from Army Group North
Ukraine .... The [Wehrmacht's] Eastern Intelligence Branch dis-
missed the activity opposite Army Group Center as 'apparently
a deception.'" 1 0
As a matter of course, intelligence agencies should seek
to draw responses from a suspected deceiver which can help
confirm or deny deceptive intent. For instance, by indicating
rejection of a suspected lie, a target may trigger a measurable
increase in deceiver activity aimed at reinforcing the lie.
The increase should heighten suspicion that deception is afoot.
Shortly after the Normandy landing, e.g., the British learned
that Hitler had ordered troops transferred from the Calais to
the Normandy areas. The British feared that Hitler no longer
viewed the Calais area as the ultimate main point of attack
and Normandy as only a feint. Controlling all German spies in
L
the UK, they had one send a special wireless message on 9 June
to his German paymasters. The agent transmitted for two hours--
a period of highly unusual length--as he argued that a large
landing would soon occur at Calais. The message was instru-
mental in Hitler's cancelling of the troop transfer, but its
special nature and length constituted a marked increase in the
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British deception effort which could have aroused German
suspicions.*
Foiling or deterring deception. A target may pursue two
courses of action upon detecting deception. He can reveal his
discovery to the deceiver, thereby forcing him to abandon the
deception and possibly also the military operation supported
by it. The target can also try to keep the discovery a secret,
stringing the deceiver along in the hope of ambushing the
latter's forces.
The above actions are premised on first detecting deception,
but it also theoretically is possible to foil a (potential)
deceiver without proof or even evidence of deception. The most
realistic way a (potential) target can do this is to remain
Some historians imply that it should have aroused German
suspicions. Sefton Delmar, for instance, notes that the agent's
transmission was of such length that, had it "been the genuine
product of an enemy agent, the [British] Radio Security Service
would have had ample time to locate its transmitter and arrest
its operators several times over." (Emphasis in original.)
Since German and British radio-direction finding techniques
were comparable, one can only wonder if anyone in Germany did
question how their agent got away with transmitting for so
leng. See Delmar, The Counterfeit Spy (New York: Harper
and Row, 1971). p. 187.
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unpredictable, for uncertainty about whether a target is
taking the bait, or how a target will deploy forces and react
to an attack, can significantly increase a deceiver's fear of
ambush. As suggested in Reese's application of game theory
to deception, if a rational deceiver rates the costs and
prospects of ambush high enough, he will probably be deterred
from initiating or continuing deception. Ironically a (potential)
target could be well-served by engaging in its ow-: deception in
order to increase enemy uncertainties and thereby decrease the
enemy's probability of resorting to deception.
It is consistent with the above emphasis on unpredictability
that deterring or foiling deception is often a byproduct of
maintaining the strategic military initiative. While it would
be folly to initiate an attack merely to avoid being deceived,
the facts remain that strategic deceptions take weeks to imple-
ment and usually require that the victim be passive if not
predictable during that time. The reason is that a deceiver
is usually thrown off balance, and his plans overtaken by
events, if the victim engages in rapid large-scale or unpredic-
table changes of behavior. These are precisely the kinds of
changes which occur when a state is pressing the strategic
initiative.
AIn sum, counter-deception is extremely difficult. It is
not enough merely to alert one's analysts to the possiblity
of deception, for such action may be dysfunctional. The insti-
tutional mechanisms (such as devil's advocates) so often
suggested for avoiding strategic surprise are obviously and I
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directly relevant for counter-deception. States fearful of
being deception targets should look for opportunities to draw
a response from a potential deceiver which helps confirm whether
or not deception is afoot. Even when deception is not evidenced
or ongoing, it may be :ossible to deter it by heightening a




We offer here two final thoughts about the utility of
deception. One is that deception's contribution to the out-
come of any military campaign remains impossible to measure
with scientific precision. Such precision would require
verifiable answers to the following questions:
0 What did a target believe before deception was
attempted?
0 What did he come to believe because of the
deception?
- What eid he decide tc do because of his deception- •
induced beliefs?
SWhat was the relative impact of those decisions and
actions on the military outcome when compared to
other factors such as generalship, quantity and
quality of weapons, material resources, troop
morale, and the like?
Each of these questions is progressively more difficult to
answer. The second and third questions are especially diffi-
cult in cases where there is only a fine line between perpetrated
deception and target self-deception, or between perpetrated
ambiguity and the ambiguity inherent in any wartime situation.
The fourth question restates an analytical problem facing not
only students of deception but also all strategic planners and
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military historians. Until one of them devises a model or
formula for measuring accurately the impact of varying factors
contributing to victory or defeat, and until adequate data
becomes available to apply such a model, it will remain impos-
sible to estimate deception's relative impact with other than
rough subjective precision.
With the above as a caveat, it is the considered view of
the NPS Deception Working Group that deception is a powerful
tool, particularly in the hands of an astute practitioner. 'I
Barton Whaley's data, while it may seem skewed towards cases
of successful deception and surprise, supports that conclu-
sion. The logic of the deception situation does so as well.
The deceiver, after all, knows the truth, and he can assume
his adversary will search for its indicators. As a result,
the deceiver can expect the victim to pick up some of the
signals intended to mislead or confuse. Should they be ig- -
nored, dismissed, or misinterpreted, the deceiver is probably
not worse off. Should they be interpreted as he intends, the
deceiver stands to gain. The target must pay attention even
to scenarios which he suspects to be untrue if they are
plausible and consequential to his interests. Although the
target may ultimately choose not to act on them, the additional
time he spends evaluating deceptive scenarios or searching for




REVIEW OF BIASES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR DECEPTION
13IAS IMPLICATION
Perceptual Biases
Perceptions are influenced by ex- It is far easier to reinforce a -
pectations. More information, and target's existing preconceptions
more unambiguous information is than to change them.
needed to recognize an unexpected
phenomenon than an expected one.
Perceptions are quick to form but It is far easier to reinforce a
resistant to change. Once an im- target's existing preconceptions
pression has been formed about an than to change them. Ability to
object, event or situation, one rationalize contradictory infor-
is biased toward continuing to mation may offset risks of secur-
perceive it in the same way. ity leaks or uncontrolled channels.
Initial exposure to ambiguous or Impact of information can be af-
blurred stimuli interferes with fected by the sequence used in
accurate perception even after feeding it to a target.
more and better information be-
comes available.
Biases in Estimating Probabilities
Probability estimates are influ- Employees of watch offices will
enced by availability--how easily generally overestimate the proba-
one can imagine an event or remem- bility uf whatever they are watch-
ber instances of an event. ing fcr. This leads to the cry
wolf syndrome. Cases of deception
are more memorable, hence more avail-
able, than instances in which decep-
tion was not employed.
Probability estimates are anchored It is easier to reinforce a target's
by some natural starting point, existinq preconceptions than to
then adjusted incrementally in re- change them.
sponse to new information or fur-
ther analysis. Normally they are
not adjusted enough.
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In translating subjective feel- Overconfidence exacerbates the im-
ings of certainty into a proba- pact of all the biases, as it leads
bility estimate, people are often to self-satisfaction and lessening
overconfident about how much they of efforts to improve judgment.
know.
Biases in Evaluating Evidence
People have more confidence in Deceiver should control as many in-
conclusions drawn from a small formation channels as possible to
body of consistent data than reduce amount of discrepant intor-
from a larger body of less con- mation available to the target.
sistent information. Deception can be effective even
with a small amount of information.
People have difficulty factoring For the deception planner, errors
the absence of evidence into of omission will be less serious
their judgments. than errors of commission. To
detect deception, analyze what in-
ferences can be drawn from fact
that some evidence is not observed.
Impressions tend to persist even Consequences of a security leak may
after the evidence on which they not be as serious as might otherwise
are based has been fully discred- be expected.
ited. You cannot "unring" a bell.
Biases in Perceiving Causality
Events are seen as part of an or- As a causal explanation, deception
derly, causal pattern. Random- is intrinsically satisfyinq because
ness, accident and error tend to it is so orderly and rational.
be rejected as explanations for
observed events. Extent to which
other people or countries pursue
a coherent, rational, goal-maxizing
policy is overestimated.
Behavior of others is attributed to It is satisfying to attribute de-
the nature of the person or country, viousness and malevolence to our
while our own bahavior is attrib- enemies, and if they are devious
uted to the nature of the situation and malevolent, of course they will
in which we find ourselves, engage in deception.
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